On Monday 8 October 2012, President Benigno Aquino III announced
that a long-expected peace accord had been reached between his negotiators and
the leadership of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). This accord seeks
to create a new regional entity, Bangsamoro, to replace the corrupt and
dysfunctional Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The agreement is a
major step on the way to a comprehensive peace deal which Aquino hopes to have
in place by 2016 when his single, six-year-term ends. Despite the positive
media echo hailing this as the end of the 40-year armed conflict and the praise
by foreign diplomats around the world, this consensus between the two
negotiating teams does not reflect the sentiment of all actors within the MILF,
nor in government, particularly local government. Both sides will have their
work cut out if this agreement is to be implemented and there is to be a
permanent peace deal in four years time.
Local power-holders could pursue judicial review again
While many local actors such as bishops and imams and some Muslim
local power holders have expressed their support for the peace deal, local
Christian bosses in the South have been suspiciously silent. In August 2008 a
similar peace framework was agreed on, the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral
Domain (MoA-AD). The MoA-AD was brought down when a well-organised wave of
protest swept from Christian settlers in Mindanao to the Supreme Court in
Manila which declared the agreement unconstitutional, preventing its signing
and implementation. Similarly, it can be expected that there will be resistance
to this peace plan now, particularly as the suggested territory for a vote on
inclusion in the Bangsamoro region is not significantly different to the area
suggested under the MoA-AD.
While this peace agreement is likely to experience little protest
from the national level, as Aquino enjoys stable support, it is less certain
whether the actors at the national level will want to use their political clout
to force local Christian leaders from the region into line. The topic is not a
high-priority for most representatives, but is of utmost importance to these
local politicians who do not want to see their economic and political clout
undermined.
Renegade MILF commanders must be reigned in
As the peace process has proceeded and it has become increasingly
clear that the MILF has given up its aspirations of an independent Mindanao,
some of the more fundamentalist, nationalist commanders within the organisation
have started breaking away. Most prominently, MILF commander Ameril Umra Kato
split from the group and founded the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF). While this group is looking relatively weak without Kato's leadership, the MILF is strongly divided and it is
not unlikely that other split-off groups could emerge to continue fighting for
an independent state.
This could become particularly threatening if the promised
reintegration programmes for the MILF’s
11,000 combatants to be paid for by foreign governments do not offer
a reasonable amount of economic stability. As these combatants for decades have
been earning their living through war, it is pivotal to integrate them economically
well into peace in order to minimise the likelihood of them joining renegade
groups.
Furthermore, the prospects for long-term peace are overshadowed by the question on whether the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) which signed a peace deal with the government in 1996, establishing the ARMM, will cooperate within the new framework of the Bangsamoro. While the government stresses that the MNLF were consulted during the peace talks, former chairman and founder of the MNLF, Nur Misuari, has contested the legitimacy of scrapping the ARMM for a new regional entity. This could be a potentila major spoiler, which both sides need to address.
Furthermore, the prospects for long-term peace are overshadowed by the question on whether the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) which signed a peace deal with the government in 1996, establishing the ARMM, will cooperate within the new framework of the Bangsamoro. While the government stresses that the MNLF were consulted during the peace talks, former chairman and founder of the MNLF, Nur Misuari, has contested the legitimacy of scrapping the ARMM for a new regional entity. This could be a potentila major spoiler, which both sides need to address.
Continued hard work on both sides could lead to sustainable peace
While these challenges are certainly important and could undermine
the entire peace process, it is also possible for them to be overcome and a
long-term peace be secured for Mindanao. Both the MILF leadership and Aquino’s
government must now approach the potential spoilers in their camp and ensure
that they cooperate. Whether this is done through the proverbial carrot or
stick will depend on their preparedness to cooperate, but it is a process which
must be begun soon. Without an expedite inclusion of these groups, the peace
process will certainly stagnate and probably be brought to collapse as in 2008.
But with a concerted effort, peace could actually be reached in Mindanao by the
end of Aquino’s term in 2016.
An
article by the same author on the collapse of the peace process in 2008 can be
found here: http://hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jsaa/article/view/212/212
